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Abstract
The rapid rise of Chinese exports over the past two decades has raised concerns
for manufacturing employment in high-income countries. Spill-overs beyond man-
ufacturing are an important issue given the large size of the non-traded sector in
modern economies and household imperfect spatial mobility. In this paper, I follow
the methodology developed by Autor et al. (2013a) to estimate the impact of Chi-
nese imports competition onto French local labor markets, with an emphasis on the
spill-overs effects beyond manufacturing. I consider a wide array of labor market
outcomes, notably the distribution of wages, thus shedding light on the impact of
low wage country imports competition on the local degree of wage inequality.
I find that local employment and total labor income in both manufacturing and
non-manufacturing are negatively affected by rising exposure to imports. Overall
the number of jobs displaced by Chinese imports competition is larger outside than
within the manufacturing sector. Jobs destructions are concentrated among low and
medium-skill occupations in both traded and non-traded sectors. Hourly wages are
negatively affected in both sectors in the middle part of the distribution. Local
labor markets strongly exposed to Chinese competition did not experience a rise
in the dispersion of hourly wages, with even a reduction of lower-tail inequality
in the non-tradable sector. I find evidence suggesting that a high-minimum wage
explains this reduction in lower-tail inequality, thus providing a striking illustration
of how labor market institutions mediate the effect of globalization-induced shocks
to labor demand.
JEL-Classification: F16, J23, J31, R11, R23
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1 Introduction
Rising imports competition from low-wage countries and its impact on employment in
the manufacturing sector has been a very widely debated issue across the industrialized
world. Among low-wage countries, China stands out as the key player. In one decade
(1998 to 2008), China’s share of world exports went from 3.3 to 9.5 percent, growing at
15 percent annually in value.1 Figure 1 displays imports and trade balance of France with
respect to China and another set of low-wage countries (LWC). China trade’s specificity
with respect to France, and many high-income countries, stems from the high growth
rate of its exports as well as the strong French trade deficit in comparison with other
LWCs. Such a sudden rise in imports competition might shrink the manufacturing sec-
tor. In turn, decline in manufacturing activity, whether or not triggered by trade shocks,
is likely to be associated with a host of local spill-over effects onto local labor markets.
Given the large size of the non-traded sector in high-income economies, the question of
the transmission of trade shocks outside of manufacturing is of outmost importance for
the study of the labor market, especially in its spatial dimension.
In this paper, I study the adjustment of local labor markets in France to the massive
increase in Chinese imports competition. This paper contributes to the literature on the
impact of trade shocks on local labor markets in two main ways. First, it applies the
methodology developed by Autor et al. (2013a) with an emphasis on spill-overs outside of
manufacturing caused by Chinese imports competition. The rich administrative dataset
used allows to look at a wider array of labor markets outcomes by sector and skill-category
– employment but also hours worked, total labor earnings. Second, it provide estimates
of the impact of Chinese imports competition along the local hourly wage distribution
inside and outside of the manufacturing sector. This sheds light on an important aspect
of globalization, the rise in North-South trade (deficit), on inequality and the structure
1This figures are based on author’s own calculation based on UN Comtrade. Hanson (2012) presents
a complete pictures of the role of emerging economies, particularly China, in world trade over the last
three decades.
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of wages in a high-income country with a highly regulated labor market such as France.2
I find substantial effect of direct competition on the manufacturing sector. A $-1000
increase in imports exposure per worker causes the manufacturing employment growth to
decrease by 6.5 percentage points. This is equivalent to a normalized coefficient of 0.37.
Regarding spill-overs to the non-traded sector, I find strong effects on employment, hours
worked and wage bills. A $-1000 increase in the imports exposure index is associated
with a decline by 4 percentage points of local employment growth rate.3 Considering
that the estimated coefficients capture absolute changes and not simply deviation from
the aggregate trend, the estimates suggest that, over the period 2001-2007, Chinese im-
ports have led to the displacement of 70,000 and 160,000 jobs in the manufacturing and
non-traded sector respectively.4 In both sectors, jobs destructions are confined to low and
middle skill occupations, with the strongest effect for middle-skill occupations in manu-
facturing and for low-skilled occupations in the non-traded sector. Impacts on average
hourly wages are weak and negative in both sectors. Looking at the impact along the
distribution of wages, I find contrasting effects across sectors. Wage are uniformly neg-
atively affected in the manufacturing sector, except for the bottom decile. Accordingly
there is no increase in wage inequality within the manufacturing sector neither in the
bottom (log ratio of the 50th to 10th percentile) or top of the distribution (log ratio of
the 90th to 50th percentile). In contrast, in the non-tradable sector, the hourly wages
are affected in the lower middle part of the distribution (deciles 2 to 6). Hence, while the
average wage impact is not significantly different from 0, the median wage is negatively
impacted. While no overall impact on the log ratio of the 90 to 10 percentile is found,
this absence of impact reflect a decrease in lower-tail inequality and a rise in upper-tail
inequality. The decrease in lower-tail inequality can be rationalized by the strongly bind-
2See e.g. Avouyi-Dovi et al. (2013) for more information on French labor market institutions regarding
collective bargaining and the minimum wage in particular. Overall, employee protection legislation (EPL)
is high in France, particularly for permanent contract. The labor market is characterized by a strong
duality following the promotion of temporary working contracts (see e.g.Bentolila et al. (2010).). The
minimum wage is strongly binding with a ratio of minimum to median wage equal to 56% in 2000 and
61% in 2007, above the OECD median (source: OECD dataset on minimum relative to average wages
of full-time workers).
3This is equivalent to a normalized coefficient of 0.25.
4The assumptions required to formulate aggregate statements are discussed in more details in Section
4.
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ing minimum wage legislation. While, in the absence of exogenous source of variation in
local minimum wage legislation, it is delicate to explicitly test this hypothesis, I provide
further evidence backing it by exploiting variation in the degree to which the minimum
wage binds at the local level.
This paper belongs to a recent but growing literature using local labor markets as
units of observations in order to analyze the impact of change in exposure to imports
competition. Typically, within-country cross-sectional variation in changes to trade ex-
posure is obtained by using the fact that local labor markets within a same country differ
in their initial sectoral composition and are thus not equally exposed to nation-wide sec-
toral changes in trade exposure (more detailed are provided in Section 3). A first strand
of this literature investigates the impact of changes in trade policy, mainly tariffs. Given
absence of major changes in tariffs among developed countries, this literature is mainly
focused on developing countries (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). Topalova (2010) analyses
the impact of India’s trade liberalization during the 1990s on poverty in Indian regions.
Kovak (2013) frames his analysis in a classical Ricardo-Viner model of capital specific
sector and estimates the impact of trade liberalization in the early 1990s on regional
(residual) wages in Brazil. My paper shares a similar empirical approach in that it uses
local sectoral specialization interacted with nation-wide sectoral shocks. However I study
the impact of Chinese imports competition rather than changes in trade policy and al-
low the wage effects to vary across sectors (traded versus non-traded sector) and along
the distribution. Moreover I investigate non-wage outcomes, such as employment and
employment-earnings.
Starting with Autor et al. (2013a), a second strand, to which this paper is the most
closely related, estimates the impact of Chinese competition onto local labor markets.
Working with US commuting-zone data, Autor et al. (2013a) interact initial local indus-
trial composition with contemporaneous changes nation-wide sectoral imports to compute
an index of exposure to imports competition that captures the value of imports-per-worker
faced by each local labor markets. In order to isolate the variation in Chinese exports
to the US that is driven by supply factors in China, as opposed to US domestic supply
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or demand shocks, they use Chinese exports to other high-income countries as an instru-
ment for actual Chinese exports to the USA. Here, I follow the same empirical strategy
and carry out a more detailed analysis in terms of the local transmission of trade shocks
outside of manufacturing in terms of sector and prevailing wages. Moreover, given the
richness of the administrative dataset used, I can look at effects on hourly rather than
weekly wages, thus canceling out variation in labor earnings related to working time and
focusing on unit factor price. I am also able to see how such effects vary along the distri-
bution, for each sector, rather than looking at average wages. Dauth et al. (2014) look at
the impact of Eastern Europe and China trade on German labor markets. They do not
find evidence of strong employment effect of Chinese imports competition either inside
or outside manufacturing. These findings must interpreted with the specific context of
German-China trade which tends to be much more balanced than the US-China trade.
France falls closer to the American case in that it has run a large overall trade deficit
and in particular with respect to China ($-billion 26 in 2007, i.e. 4.5 percent of France’s
overall trade, see Figure 1). Lasting trade deficits are likely to be associated with stronger
labor market effects as workers and resources, in the absence of a binding balanced-trade
condition, need not flow from a subset of the traded sector to another to compensate
rising imports.
There has been vibrant debate, both within and outside of academic economics, re-
garding the impact of globalization on the structure of wages and inequality, however
the difficulty to obtain local measure of wage inequality has impeded the application of
“local labor market approach” to this issue.5 Instead most papers on the topic focus
on the impact of globalization on job-polarization, that is the disproportional growth of
employment in occupations traditionally located at the bottom and top of the wage dis-
tribution (see e.g. Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor et al. (2013b)). Alternatively, they
examine variation in the college wage premium (e.g. Lindley and Machin (2014)). The
exhaustive nature of the data as well as information on hours worked is key here in order
5For instance Harrison et al. (2011), in their review of recent theoretical and empirical works on
trade and within-country inequality, do not cite any papers looking at the impact of globalization on the
distribution of wages using the empirical approach used here.
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to obtain reliable statistics for different quantiles of the hourly wage distribution for each
employment area considered. Moreover, examining outcomes at the local labor market
level (rather than industry- or firm-level analysis) offers the crucial advantage of study-
ing the impact of trade-shocks beyond the manufacturing sector, which, in high-income
economies, accounts for a limited percentage of overall employment and labor income.
There is a large theoretical literature linking trade and wage inequality. The classic
Heckscher-Ohlin framework, considering two factors, high-skill and low-skill, posits that
trade should increase the wage gap between skill and non-skill labor in the skill-intensive
country.6 More recent analysis based on less stylized models, featuring for instance labor
market frictions (Davidson et al., 1999), firm-heterogeneity and bargaining (Helpman
et al., 2010) or fair wage considerations (Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009) lead as well to
the conclusion that opening to trade increases wage inequality. It must be noted that a
mechanism through which trade increases income inequality in models of international
trade with labor market frictions is through an increase in unemployment (e.g. Egger
and Kreickemeier (2009); Helpman et al. (2010)). However given the nature of the data
available, I focus on the price of employed factors, defined here as hourly wage, and
do not consider how unemployment risk or difficultly in working full-time is affected by
trade in computing the wage distribution. While this can be an important caveat when
evaluating the impact on workers welfare,7 it remains important to see to which extent
the structure of wages is affected by imports competition and how this spill-overs onto
the service sector. A motivation to resort to analysis along the wage distribution is based
on recent models of international trade which suggests that trade increases inequality in
ways that is not captured by the observable skill-premium. For instance, Amiti and Davis
(2012) develop a model in which an increase in foreign imports competition drives wages
up in input-importing and output-exporting firms and reduce wages in firms serving only
6The empirical predictions of the basic HOS model has however been largely discredited by the
simultaneous rises in wage inequality in both low-skill and high-skill intensive countries Harrison et al.
(2011).
7For instance, the model featuring costly labor mobility between sectors by Artuc et al. (2010), trade
liberalization can trigger a decline in the wages of import competing industries and nevertheless lead
to a rise in lifetime income due to the possible reallocation of the workforce towards exports-oriented
industries.
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the domestic market. In case the correlation between firms’ share of high-skill employees
and importer or exporter-status is not perfect, such an increase in inequality would not
be captured by using a measure of skill-premium as dependent variable. Looking at the
whole distribution of wages allows to capture such an effect while remaining agnostic
about the specific mechanism driving the change in the wage distribution.
The rest of paper is structured as follow. In Section 2, I briefly present the data
used in this study. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy adopted to identify and
estimate the impact of rising Chinese imports competition on a wide array of labor market
outcomes. In Section 4, I present and discuss the results regarding employment inside and
beyond manufacturing (subsection 4.1), present some extensions and robustness checks
(subsection 4.1.3) and display results regarding the wage distribution (subsection 4.2).
The conclusion follows.
2 Data
Data for this analysis originates from several sources. Data on employment and wage dis-
tribution are drawn from an employer-employee administrative dataset. This database
called DADS postes (De´claration annuelle des donne´es sociales) contains exhaustive data
on non-agricultural salaried job-spells in France. I focus mostly on the competitive sector
and do not include workers employed by fully public institutions. Statistics are computed
at the “employment zone” level.8 Like the US “commuting area” used in Autor et al.
(2013a), employment zones’ definition is based on a criterion of self-contained commuting
which limits the acuity of issues usually associated with spatial contagion across admin-
istratively defined units. There are 348 such units according to their 1990 definition.
I document the sector to which a job is associated by using a 4-digit NACE (rev.1) code
reported by the plant (establishment) where the job is located. This NACE code is itself
determined based on what the main activity of the plant is (not that of the firm). Based
on this information, I can distinguish between employment in manufacturing and in the
non-traded sector. More importantly I can construct a very accurate index of exposure to
8“Zone d’emploi” in French.
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Chine products competition (see next section). Regarding French and China’s trade, I use
UN Comtrade data on from 1995 to 2007. The Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature
of year 1992 is mapped into 4-digit NACE sector codes using conversion tables available
on Eurostat’s website RAMON. More details are provided in Appendix A. I restrict
the sample to jobs occupied by workers aged between 16 and 64, with strictly positive
earnings and hours worked. I aggregate data at the non-traded versus traded level for
each area-year (1995, 2001 and 2007) and take the first difference of the data and obtain
a final dataset of 348 areas observed over two 6-year periods.
Some data regarding private employment during the 1980s (1982 to 1990) and as well
as the share of college graduates are taken from public available census data, for the
waves 1982, 1990 and 1999. The two latter are respectively associated with year 1995
and 2001.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. The average size (measured by non-
auxiliary jobs) of an employment zone was 180,000 in 1995, with a median about half the
mean, suggesting some skewness. With almost 2 millions worker, the Paris employment
area is a clear outlier in terms of size. All results presented below are robust to the exclu-
sion of this area. Employment in manufacturing declined during both periods, although
much more markedly between 2001 and 2007 than between 1995 and 2001. Hours worked
per job are on average much higher in the manufacturing sector than in the non-traded
sector (1600 versus 1290 in 1995). Hours worked might thus provide a more comparable
and relevant measure than job count when comparing impact of Chinese competition
across sectors. High and medium skill occupations account roughly for 30 % of employ-
ment.9 The variables ∆IPW and ∆DPW stand for changes in, respectively, imports
per worker (IPW) and trade deficit per worker (DPW). The precise definition of these
variables is given in section 3. For now, it is sufficient to see that the two variables are
very close, owing to the fact that the rise in French-Chinese trade is mainly driven by
France’s rising purchases of Chinese products. Moreover, it appears that there has been
an acceleration in the pace of imports/trade deficit growth between the two periods.
9The exact definition of low, medium and high skill workers will is given in Section 4.1.3.
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3 Empirical Strategy: Measurement and identifica-
tion
In this section I describe the empirical strategy adopted to estimate the direct impact of
Chinese imports competition. To measure the local exposure to Chinese imports, I build
on Autor et al. (2013a) and compute a index of imports exposure, called “Imports-per-
Worker”. This index interacts initial local industrial composition of the manufacturing
sector with contemporaneous nation-wide Chinese imports by sector.
Formally, the index ∆IPW is defined according to the following formula:
∆IPWit =
NS∑
s=1
List
Lst
∆Mst (1)
where ∆Mst stands for the changes in Chinese exports to France between periods t
and t+1 for sector s, Lst is equal sector s employment in France for at time t. Lit is total
employment in area/period i, t while List is employment in area i in sector s at time t.
10
To estimate the impact of Chinese imports penetration on some local labor market
outcomes Y (e.g. employment in manufacturing etc.), I use the following baseline speci-
fication:
∆ log Yit = ∆IPWitβ +X
′
itδ + ηt + εit (2)
To fix ideas, consider the case where ∆ log Yit is the growth rate of employment in
the manufacturing sector. There are many plausible reasons why in specification (2),
∆IPW might be correlated with the error term ε even after controlling for an extensive
set of covariates (discussed more in depth in the next section). Nation-wide sector specific
shocks (supply or demand) are partly driving the amount of goods imported in France
from abroad. If these shocks affect simultaneously sectoral imports and labor demand,
10This variable is thus closely related to the widely used Bartik-instrument Bartik (1991) in that
it interacts initial sectoral composition and contemporaneous sector-wide trends. Note however, that
I use ∆IPWit as a causal variable and not as an instrument. In fact, the breadth of the outcomes
affected by ∆IPWit could raise concerns about the plausibility of the exclusion-restriction when using
the Bartik-instrument to instrument for changes in local employment or unemployment.
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OLS estimates will be biased. To formalize this idea, let us consider the case where the
error term εit can be decomposed between (i) a weighted sum of nation-wide sectoral
supply and demand shocks (which we denote ws and xs respectively) and (ii) an error
term uncorrelated with any other terms included in the regression. For simplicity we
omit the time subscript:
εi = aS
∑
s
λisws + aD
∑
s
λisxs + i
where the parameter aS and aD determines the sign and magnitude of the impact
of supply and demand shocks, respectively, on manufacturing employment growth and
λis is an unobserved term representing the “importance” of sector s in location i (a
simplification could be to set it equal to List
Lit
, i.e. the initial employment share of sector
s in location i). Collecting sectoral shocks ws and xs respectively in vectors w and x,
noting m the vector containing the changes in imports to initial employment ratios (with
typical element ms =
∆Ms
Ls
) and θis =
List
Lit
the share of sector s in total employment in
location i, and omitting exogenous regressors for simplicity, we can rewrite equation (2)
as:
∆ log Yi = βθ
′
im + λ
′
i(aSw + aDx) + εi (3)
This specification is reminiscent of panel model with interactive fixed-effect (Bai,
2009) in the sense that the unobserved heterogeneity term λi is multidimensional (the
length of vector λi is here equal to the number of sectors in the economy) and is allowed
to interact with shocks that are common through the rest of the cross-sectional units.
Hence OLS estimation of the main specification will be biased due the covariance
between ∆IPWi and λ
′
i(aSγ + aDψ) which we can write as:
11
cov(θ′im, λ
′
i(aSw + aDx)) = aSθ
′
icov(m,w)λi + aDθ
′
icov(m,x)λi
11In the derivation of this expression I consider θi and λi as fixed parameter vectors and m and w as
random vectors.
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If we assume that s 6= s′ ⇒ cov(ms, ws′) = cov(xs, ws′) = 0 which amounts to ignoring
cross-sectors relationships (driven for instance by input-output linkages or substitution
in consumption between goods), we get the following expression:
cov(θ′im, λ
′
i(aSw + aDx)) = aS
∑
s
θisλiscov(ms, ws) + aD
∑
s
θisλiscov(ms, xs) (4)
We expect the covariance between nationwide unobserved sectoral supply shocks and
imports-per-worker (cov(ms, ws)) to be negative. When French producers in sector s
are subject to a negative supply shock ( ws < 0 e.g. mandatory nation-wide reduction
in weekly working-time with no reduction in monthly wages), one would expect an in-
crease in purchase in goods s from foreign suppliers, including China and other low-wage
countries. That suggests cov(ms, ws) < 0. On the other hand, as xs represents demand
shocks, one would expect that cov(ms, xs) > 0.
Positive supply and demand shocks are expected under general conditions to increase
employment, hence we can assume aS > 0 and aD > 0. According to this framework,
the bias introduced by unobserved sectoral shocks could either be positive or negative
depending on the relative magnitude of supply and demand shocks and how they affect
imports from low-wage country. Because these nation-wide shocks affect each community
differently, through to the vector λi, including periods fixed-effects does not solve the
issue.
We resort to an instrumental variable strategy whereby we instrument actual exports
from low-wage countries to France by Chinese exports to a set of high-income countries
whose economic cycle is weakly related to that France.12 The formula for the instrument
is the following:
∆IPW oit =
1
Lit
∑
s
List
Lst
∆M ost (5)
where ∆M ost is Chinese exports to the set of selected other high-income countries.
12The list of countries is almost the same as in Dauth et al. (2014), except that it excludes the United
Kingdom and includes Denmark, South-Korea, Argentina and Chile. The list includes the following
countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, and South Korea. Note
tat we excluded all countries from continental Europe which are part of the euro zone.
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The identifying assumption underpinning the validity of this instrument is that Chinese
exports to these countries, i.e. the vector ∆M o, are independent from domestic shocks in
France (contained in vectors w and x in our example) so that the statistical association
between French imports from China and Chinese exports to these high-income countries
is only driven by supply-side improvements in China. This assumption seems credible
given that China underwent major economic reforms since the 1980s which accelerated
over the 1990s, culminating with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in
2001. These reforms were deeply influenced by China’s own domestic politics and decided
independently from development pertaining specifically to France.13 The choice of other
high-income countries is such that they represent a small percentage of French exports
so that the exclusion restriction appears credible.
Figure 2 contain three maps of France regarding IPW and employment growth over
the 2001-2007 period. Table 1 shows that decline in manufacturing has taken place over
the 2 periods but was much stronger over the second one. Imports and Trade deficit
per worker grew faster over the second period as well. Figure 3 displays the first-stage,
plotting observations from both periods (after taking out period fixed-effect) as well as
best linear fit and a 95 % confidence interval. Figure 4 display the first stage for the long-
differences. In both cases, the instrument is a strong predictor of the endogenous regressor
∆IPWit. The first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the stack specification with no-
covariate is 41 way above the critical value of 16 suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005)
for 2SLS estimates. The corresponding reduced-forms with respect to manufacturing and
non-traded employment are plotted in the Figures 5 and 6.
The period we cover stretches from 1995 to 2007. The choice of the beginning date is
driven by data availability regarding local sectoral composition, wages and hours worked.
The end of the period is marked by the onset of the Great Recession which deeply
affected trade flows as well as GDP in ways that is very likely to be correlated across
high-income countries, thus making the identifying assumption less credible over the
13For an extensive account of Chinese reforms, subsequent growth and increasing economic openness
see Brandt and Rawski (2008).
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post-2007 period.14
4 Results
4.1 Employment and Total Earnings
4.1.1 Manufacturing sector
The first specification measures the impact of IPW on employment and total hours worked
in the manufacturing sector. Results are displayed in Table 2. All specifications include
the initial value of overall employment in the employment area.15 Column (1) implies
that a $ 1000 increase in ∆IPW is associated with a 6.4 percentage point decrease
in manufacturing employment growth rate. We see in Column (2) that instrumenting
∆IPW by ∆IPW o yields a higher (in absolute value) coefficient of -10. Considering the
formula for OLS bias in Equation (4), it suggests that, under the maintained hypothesis
that the instrument is exogenous, France’s increasing imports of Chinese products are
for a substantial part explained by French idiosyncratic demand shocks that boost both
employment and imports thus causing an upward bias in OLS estimates. This result is
similar to what is found for the US case for by Autor et al. (2013a). In Column (3),
we control for the initial share of employment in the manufacturing sector. Under this
specification, variation across employment areas comes only from differences in the local
specialization within the manufacturing sector and not from differences in terms of share
of the manufacturing sector as a wole. It uses the fact that Chinese imports growth has
been very uneven across subsets of the manufacturing sector. The inclusion of that term
does not affect substantially the estimate, which is equal to -8.16
14Figure 1 shows the decline in imports from China occurring in 2008/2009.
15This control accounts for the fact there tends to be a negative relationship between city population
and its growth rate, as pointed in Card (2007) and Faggio and Overman (2014).
16Unlike Autor et al. (2013a), I do not consider employment over population but growth rate in
employment (and other outcomes). This choice is mainly dictated by the data. The years considered
(1995,2001,2007) do not correspond to a census year. Hence there is no data on overall working age
population. Overall adult (above 18) population, as opposed to working age population (which would
typically include the 16 to 65 year olds) can be approximated by the number of registered voters for
the presidential elections of 1995, 2001 and 2007. In a set of unreported regression, I show that adult
population proxied by registered voters do not respond to China-induced trade shocks. Results are
available upon request. In the absence of reaction of population adjustment, trade shocks’ impact on the
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Column (4) and Column (5) test the robustness of the results, relaxing further the
identifying assumptions required to interpret the coefficient causally. Column (4) adds a
series of additional controls that discards some potential confounding factors. It controls
for the initial share of college-educated residents, of women, foreigners, and production
workers in the workforce. Including these controls allows each employment area to have
a specific trend proportional to each of these initial shares. The rational to include
production workers is to account for the potential exposure of employment areas to tech-
nical change and automatization that could possibly lead to a decline in labor demand
by the manufacturing sector independently from globalization (Autor and Dorn, 2013).
Women’s labor supply is often found to be considerably more elastic than that of men.17
Hence, a shock of a given size to local labor demand might carry more or less impact
on overall employment depending on the local share of women in the workforce. Finally,
the share of college graduates accounts for the fact that there has been an increasing
gap in employment and unemployment rates between college and non-college educated
individuals. The estimate decrease marginally in magnitude from Column (3) to Column
(4) with an absolute value of 7.1. In Column (5) includes “region”-fixed effects18, thus
allowing each region to have a specific trend. Again, we do not see a large decline in the
estimate which, at a value of 6.4, remains significant at the 1 percent level.
I now put these results into perspective and gauge their economic significance. It is
important to note that the first-difference approach adopted in this paper identifies the
relative impact of changes in trade exposure. In that sense it identifies how local labor
markets exposed to Chinese competition deviate from the aggregate trend. In our setting,
making aggregate predictions necessitates additional assumptions such that the coefficient
associated with ∆IPW reflect absolute changes in outcomes and not simply changes rel-
ative to the aggregate trend. In fact, aggregate prediction requires period fixed-effects
not to be a function of the regressor aggregated across employment zones.19 This as-
change of log employment translates roughly one-to-one to the change in the log ratio of employment to
adult population.
17See Bargain et al. (2014) for recent internationally comparable results on the topic.
18There are 22 so called “Regions” in metropolitan France.
19See Appendix B for a more formal argument.
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sumption is not necessary in order to obtain consistent estimates of imports competition
impact on local labor markets but I adopt it in this paragraph in order to, somewhat
heuristically, get an order of magnitude of the estimated effect if it was to reflect absolute
changes.20 Between 1995 and 2007, employment in the manufacturing sector declined by
14.4 percent. It declined by 1.7 percent over the last period (1995-2001) and declined
by 13.3 percent over the second period (2001-2007).21 I predict import-driven changes in
growth rate in manufacturing by using our 2SLS estimates times the observed change in
import-per-worker at the local level times the share of variation in imports explained by
Chinese supply-side factors. I deduce this share from the R-square of a simple bivariate
regression of ∆IPWit on ∆IPW
o
it (after partialling out all covariates included in Column
(5)).22 This simple computation allows to retrieve the nation-wide effect of Chinese im-
ports penetration on manufacturing employment. I find a nation-wide effect of -0.27 and
-1.44 percentage-points for the first and second periods respectively. Hence, under the
stated assumptions, we find that Chinese imports are responsible for about 11 percent of
the decline in the French manufacturing sector employment over the period 2001-2007.
In terms of jobs, that implies that imports Chinese competition destroyed 14,000 jobs
over the first period and 73,000 jobs over the second. This exercise is therefore consistent
with the notions that (i) trade with China have become increasingly relevant for indus-
trial employment in developed economies, (ii) other factors, such as technological change,
lie behind the rapid decline of industrial employment in France.
Columns (6) and (7) apply the same specification as in Column (5) changing only the
dependent variable. Columns (6) shows the impact on total hours worked. The estimate
is very close to that in Column (5) suggesting no change in average hours worked per
job. This is interesting in the light of the widespread notion that imports competition
has promoted part-time and unconventional forms of employment (source). Column (7)
20This point is also discussed in Topalova (2010).
21These figures are based on the exhaustive job-level dataset “DADS postes” when aggregated at the
sector/year level for all of France.
22The predicted change for employment zone i at time t is thus equal to: git = R
2 × β × ∆IPWit
where R2 refers to the partial first-stage R-square. The aggregate predicted change is then simply:
gt = R
2 × β ×∆IPW t, where xt means the average of variable x across the cross-section at time t.
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looks at overall employment earnings (hours worked times hourly wage). The impact
is sensibly larger than that on hours worked suggesting a mild decline in the average
hourly wage. This is confirmed in Column (8) which finds a statistically significant (at
the 5 % confidence level) impact of imports competition on average wage. This result
contrasts with those of Autor et al. (2013a) who find no effect on average weekly wage
within manufacturing. Although downward wage rigidity (nominal or real) is a salient
feature of the manufacturing sector, it is not incompatible with this finding. Indeed the
present results reflect the effect on wage growth in deviation from aggregate trends and
could be explained by low wage for the new hires or simply a lower albeit positive wage
growth rate.
4.1.2 Outside of manufacturing
Main impact on the non-traded sector
I now turn to the effect of Chinese imports penetration employment and hours worked
in the non-traded sector as a dependant variable. The results are displayed in Table 3.
The effect is weaker and less precisely estimated. The weaker effect found on the non-
traded sector can be explained by the fact that there is a decline in demand for non-traded
output, employers in this sector benefit from a positive local labor supply shocks as a
share of workers displaced from the manufacturing sector are likely to be looking for jobs
locally. Normalizing variables, estimate from Column (5) suggests that a one standard
deviation increase in ∆IPW cause a decline in non-traded employment of 0.23 standard
deviation. We notice that estimates in Column (6) and (7) are very similar and that unlike
in the manufacturing sector in that average hourly wage is not significantly affected.
Under the same assumptions as in the previous paragraph, I can get an order of magni-
tude regarding the aggregate impact of Chinese imports competition on job displacement
in the non-traded sector.23 Using the formula explained in footnote 4.1.1 leads to the
23The use of the word displacement rather than destruction is warranted by the fact jobs in the non-
traded sector, following a local trade shock, are very likely to be moved to a new location and not purely
destroyed. In fact, there has been positive growth in non-traded sector employment over the period
considered suggesting that the estimated impact are local in nature. This contrast with the generalized
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conclusion that local growth in non-traded employment was reduced by 0.20 over the first
period and 1.42 over the second. This suggests that 270,000 jobs in the non-traded sector
were displaced due to spill-overs associated with China-induced trade shocks between
2001 and 2007, a much larger number than what is found for the manufacturing sector.
The impact of Chinese imports competition onto the non-tradable sector is indirect
in that it operates through its impact on the manufacturing sector. The ratio of the
estimates from tables 3 and 2 are similar to a “local multiplier effect” (Moretti, 2010)
in the sense that it defines the elasticity of non-tradable employment to employment in
the manufacturing sector.24 Taking estimates of Column 3 from both tables leads to a
ratio of 0.66, which given an average ratio of non-traded to manufacturing employment
of 2.5 suggest a job-to-job effect of 1.65. Moretti (2010) resorts to the Bartik-instrument
to estimate directly the impact of growth in tradable employment on the growth of the
non-tradable sector. He finds an impact of about 1.6, a figure very close to the present
findings, especially considering that he does not use imports competition as a source of
variation in local manufacturing employment. This suggests that shocks to local labor
demand induced by trade-shocks trigger spill-overs of the same magnitude as those cap-
tured by the Bartik-instrument, which encapsulates sectoral shocks of all sources (e.g.
domestic demand shock, technological shocks etc.) by using directly nation-wide changes
in sectoral employment (Partridge et al., 2013).
Decomposing the impact on the non-traded sector
I look into a finer decomposition of the impact of the non-traded sector. Table 4
shows how the spill-overs associated with rising Chinese imports competition on the local
manufacturing sector vary across different subsets of the non-traded sector. The table
decline in manufacturing employment.
24To see this, recall that the coefficients on ∆IPW of Table 3 and 2 are semi-elasticities of, respectively,
non-traded and traded employment with respect to ∆IPW : βNon−Traded =
∂∆ ln(LNon−Traded)
∂∆IPW and
βTraded =
∂∆ ln(LTraded)
∂∆IPW where Ls refers to employment in sector s. Therefore the ratio yields an
elasticity βNon−TradedβTraded =
∂∆ ln(LNon−Traded)
∂∆ ln(LTraded)
.
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contains two panels, the upper panel displays results for the specification without region-
fixed effects and the lower one with region fixed-effects.
Focusing first on the upper panel, the most strongly affected industries are construc-
tion (Column 1) and hiring services (Column 2). Hiring services includes temporary
workers. Hence the large effect on that sector can be rationalized by the fact (i) these
workers are typically the adjustment buffer firms resort to first when adjusting the size
of their labor force, (ii) a large share of such workers are “lent” to the manufacturing
and construction sector. Clearly, a share of the decline in employment in temporary work
comes the direct effect of trade shocks on manufacturing. It is not possible from currently
available data to know in which types of firms temporary workers are actually employed.
Therefore I cannot precisely decompose the trade-induced decline in temporary work in
its direct and indirect components. Construction is a sector that by definition is very
non-tradable. It is also very intensive in temporary work (DARES, 2009), therefore part
of the jobs shredded by construction firms are counted in Column (2) in the “hiring ser-
vices”. Yet, despite this underestimation, the impact on the construction sector are large
which confirms the intuition that the producers of hardly tradable output are heavily
impacted by decline in local demand. The rest of the traded sector is also affected, al-
though to a much lower extent. The estimate for business services, except hiring services,
is strongly negative but imprecisely estimated (p-value = 12.7%). These results contrast
with Dauth et al. (2014) who find virtually no effect of trade shocks on the non-traded
sector besides the business service sector that is very intensive in temporary workers lent
to the manufacturing sector. In the lower panel we can see that the inclusion of region-
fixed effects reduces most point-estimates and mostly alters their precision. Only the
impact of construction remains significant, although the coefficient for hiring services is
almost significant at the 10 % level (p-value of 10.5 %).
4.1.3 Robustness Checks and extensions
Placebo regressions
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In spite of the extensive set of controls, as well as the instrumentation of ∆IPW ,
there remains the suspicion that results displayed so far could be picking up a secular
decline of employment in some local labor markets. I test this possibility by regressing
employment growth on lead values of ∆IPW . If future values of ∆IPW predicts cur-
rent low job growth, it could could imply that estimates presented until now are picking
up the impact of an omitted factor correlated with rising imports competition (for in-
stance labor-saving technological change). I use data from the French Census for periods
1982-1990 and 1990-1999 an compute overall private employment growth and resort to
the administrative data, used in the rest of the analysis, for the 2001-2007. Table 5
displays the results. In columns (1) and (2), employment growth in the private sector
(reexpressed in 6 year period equivalent growth rate) for periods 1990-1999 and 2001-
2007 is regressed on ∆IPW for periods 1995-2001 and 2001-2007. In columns (3) and
(4), employment growth in the private sector (reexpressed in 5 year period equivalent)
for periods 1982-1990 and 1990-1999 is regressed on ∆IPW for periods 1995-2001 and
2001-2007. Focusing on the IV regression results, we can see that while ∆IPW is associ-
ated with a decline in contemporaneous employment growth (Column 2), it is associated
with higher growth rate in lagged employment, suggesting that the negative coefficients
estimated above reflects a causal impact of Chinese imports competition on job growth
rather than a secular decline. On the contrary, employment areas with high lead values
of ∆IPW were experiencing above average growth in employment during the 1980s and
1990s.
Impact by skill-category
Retaining the specification of Column (6) from Table 2 and 3, I now estimate skill-
specific impact of imports competition sector-by-sector. As is usual with administrative
data, there is no information on workers’ educational achievements, therefore I use a
definition of skill based on occupations. I break down employment into three broad
categories (low, medium and high skill) based on so-called “social and professional cat-
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egories”. Employees and production workers are associated with low-skill, medium-skill
contains “intermediary professions” and high-skill includes “managers and intellectual
professions”.25 The upper panel of Table 7 display results for the manufacturing sector.
It shows that negative effect of imports competition are concentrated in low-skilled and
medium-skilled occupations in manufacturing sector. These findings are consistent with a
polarizing effect of imports competition on the job composition, as intermediary jobs are
markedly more affected than low-skill occupations and high-skill jobs are not significantly
impacted. This is also consistent with the process of skill-upgrading caused by Chinese
imports competition at the firm-level detected by Mion and Zhu (2013). The previous
result on average wage growth should be interpreted in light of this compositional effect:
despite considerable skill-upgrading (as measured by shift in the occupational structure
of the manufacturing sector), the Chinese imports competition had an overall negative
effect on average hourly wages.
The lower panel shows estimates for the non-tradable sector, depicting broadly sim-
ilar patterns. However, job losses are more concentrated in the low-skill occupations
and magnitude are on average lower. We also notice a significantly positive effect on
the growth rate of high-skill occupations. Measuring the share of non-traded sector jobs
that are taken up by individuals previously employed in the manufacturing sector would
shed light on the reallocation process triggered by imports competition and how people
initially employed in the non-traded sector are affected.
Net imports
Dauth et al. (2014) emphasizes that local labor markets can be positively affected
by trade. Chinese economic growth is associated with a surge in imports. If some local
labor markets are specialized in sectors for which Chinese demand grows particularly fast,
Chinese growth could stimulate local labor demand. As shown in the introduction and in
Figure 1, French-Chinese trade is particularly unbalanced. In 2007 for instance, French
25This codification follows Caliendo et al. (2012) who use the same database (DADS) to analyze the
hierarchical organization of French firms.
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exports to China amounted $-bn 14 while its imports amounted to $-bn 40, thus leaving
a deficit of $-bn 26 equivalent to 4.5 % of French total trade (exports plus imports).
In this section, I check whether considering net imports (or trade deficit) as opposed
to overall imports lead to substantially different estimates. I do not test exports and
imports separately mainly because I do not dispose of a relevant and valid instrument
for French exports to China.26 Table 6 based on the same specifications as in Table 2
with the only exception that the variable imports per workers has been replaced by a
“deficit-per-worker” variable. Coefficients are very close to those in Table 2, although of
a somewhat larger magnitude. It is logical as the deficit-per-worker nets out any positive
effect associated with rise in exports that would not be captured by the gross imports
measure.
These estimates provide some information regarding what would have been the impact
in terms of manufacturing employment of balancing trade with respect to China. 27 Given
that the average increase in ∆DPW has been 690 over last period 2001-2007, given a
partial R-square of ∆DPW on ∆IPW o equal to 0.13, in the absence of increase in trade
deficit , manufacturing employment would have grown by 0.80 percentage point more,
representing about 40,000 jobs (based on coefficient displayed in Column 5).
4.2 Effect on the Distribution of Wages
There is by now a large body empirical work showing that changes in imports exposure
has a very heterogenous impact across firms. For instance, Bloom et al. (2011) find that
surge in Chinese imports competition has a negative employment effect that is consider-
ably smaller for innovative firms. Amiti and Davis (2012) shows that, following a trade
liberalization episode in Indonesia, large exporters or importers increased their wages rel-
ative to firms serving the domestic market only. As explained in the introduction, such
heterogeneous effects along firm-level characteristics will be associated with increase in
26Imports by China of products made in other high income countries could be a possible instrument.
The strength of such instrument is however very low, owing to the fact that Chinese product basket of
imported goods vary a lot across provenance-countries, much more so than its export basket (which is
quite uniform as attested by the strength of the first-stage).
27Balancing trade is equivalent to setting the average deficit per worker (∆DPW ) from its average
value to 0
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wage dispersion in ways that are unlikely to be fully captured by a variable pertaining
to individual-level skill, such as college education or type of education. On the other
hand such impact will be reflected in the overall distribution of wages. In this section, I
estimate the impact of Chinese imports competition on each decile of the wage distribu-
tion, thus capturing overall changes in wage dispersion while remaining agnostic about
which the particular mechanism through which Chinese imports competition is affecting
inequality.
The upper panel of Table 8 displays the results regarding the manufacturing sector.
All deciles but the bottom one are significantly negatively affected by imports compe-
tition. The estimate is very imprecisely estimated for the 1st decile, resulting in an
insignificant coefficient in spite of a very large point estimate. The impact for the median
is somewhat lower than the effect on the average wage. More over the highest estimates
are those for the 8th and 9th deciles. Hence, the distribution of hourly wage in manufac-
turing is not made less egalitarian by exposure to imports competition, instead it’s been
uniformly decreased except for the bottom decile. Most estimates are barely significant,
note however that only results based on the most stringent specification are displayed.
Unreported coefficients based on the same specification without region-fixed yield very
similar point estimates with more precision.28
The lower panel of Table 8 displays results for the non-traded sector. We see that
the non-significant effect on average wage hides considerable heterogeneity across deciles.
There are strong effects in the middle-part of the distribution, between the 2nd and 7th
deciles included. The impact on the median wage is much stronger than that on the
average wage. The median wage effect is of the same magnitude as in the manufacturing
sector and is more precisely estimated. This shows that trade shocks are diffused to the
local non-tradable sector. Here again the bottom decile is not significantly affected, with
a point estimated very close to zero. A binding minimum wage could be a reason behind
this absence of effect (more on this below). There is also no significant impact on the
28The results are available upon request.
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two top deciles.
In Table 9, we report how different measures of wage dispersion/inequality have been
affected by China-induced trade shocks. Column (1) displays the estimated effect on
changes in the log of 90th to 10th percentile ratio of the local wage distribution. While
the coefficient is positive for manufacturing, it is very imprecisely estimated. It is very
close to 0 and insignificant in the non-tradable sector as well. Hence it appears, based
on that measure of inequality, that that Chinese imports competition, while it had some
notable impact on wage and on employment did not move affected local labor markets
away from the general trend towards compression of the French wage distribution over
the period considered (Verdugo, 2014). We decompose the change of the log ratio of
the 90th to 10th percentile into the sum of the change of the log ratio of the 50th to
10th percentile (lower-tail inequality) plus the change of the log ratio of the 90th to 50th
percentile ratio (upper tail inequality). In the case of manufacturing, although point
estimates suggest a rise in lower-tail dispersion, none is significantly different from zero.
In the non-traded sector however, it appears that null effect of imports competition on the
90t to 10t percentile ratio results from a combination of increase in upper-tail dispersion
(Column 2) and compression in the lower-tail of the distribution (Column 3). Here again,
the binding role of the minimum wage provides a plausible explanation to these findings.
The minimum wage is nationally set in France and there is no variation in the legal
definition of the minimum wage across employment areas or sectors of employment.29 It
is however more or less binding, meaning that there is variation in the share of workers
working at the minimum wage across locations and sectors. We use this variation to
test the hypothesis whether a binding minimum wage explains the absence of impact of
trade shocks on the lower decile of the wage distribution. If in a given employment area
and sector, more than 10 % of jobs are paid are the minimum wage, then, one would
not expect any impact of trade-induced demand shocks on the bottom decile of the wage
distribution. Inversely, employment areas where less than 10 % of jobs are paid at the
minimum wage, the bottom decile of the distribution is exposed to the downward pressure
29While there are some legal exemptions to the minimum wage, they account for a small share of the
population, see Kramarz and Philippon (2001).
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associated with negative labor demand shocks. I introduce an interaction term between
∆IPW and a binary variable equal to 1 if less than 10 % of employees (in manufacturing
or the non-tradable sector depending on which sector the dependent variable pertains)
in the initial year of the period are paid at the minimum wage. This interaction term is
then instrumented by the product of ∆IPW o and the binary variable. Noting S10 the
binary variable, the specification we estimate is the following:
∆ log q10,it = ∆IPWit · β1 + ∆IPWit × S10,it · β2 +X ′itδ + ηt + εit (6)
Following the line of reasoning exposed above, one would expect β1 to be close to
zero, and β2 to be negative, meaning that wage losses are concentrated in areas/sector
where the minimum wage is not binding for the first decile. There are obvious limitations
to this exercise, as the initial share of minimum wage employees could be considered
endogenous to posterior growth in the 1st decile of the wage distribution. There could
be for instance some unobservable characteristics affecting both minimum wage ratios
and subsequent wage growth rate. Note however that intuitively, one would expect such
unobservables to cause high minimum wage ratio and lower wage growth. On the con-
trary, our hypothesis states low minimum wage ratios should be associated with lower
wage growth when associated with strong exposure rise in Chinese imports competition.
Consequently, endogeneity of low minimum wage local ratio seems likely to introduce an
upward bias in estimates that we expect to be negative.
Table 10 presents the results separately for the manufacturing and non-manufacturing
sector. Column (1) displays results for the manufacturing sector. Results are as expected:
the estimate associated with the interaction term is significantly negative while that on
∆IPW is not significantly different from 0. Results from Column (2) are based on a
specification where S10 is directly introduced, thus allowing each employment area to
follow a different trend depending on wether its initial share of minimum wage workers
exceeds 10 %. Point estimates remain remarkably stable but are less precisely estimated
and not significantly different from 0 at the 10 % level. Regarding the non-traded sec-
tor, results show more clearly that areas where the first decile was not covered by the
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minimum wage experienced a negative impact of imports competition, while the others
were (unsurprisingly) protected. Column (4) shows that low minimum wage ratio areas
have a higher unconditional trend in terms of the growth rate of their bottom decile (2 %
higher), but also that Chinese competition induced strong negative impact on the bottom
decile in these areas (-4.4%).
5 Conclusion
Local employment and total labor income in the manufacturing sector are reduced in em-
ployment areas more exposed to Chinese imports. The effect goes beyond manufacturing
sector as non-traded employment is also significantly affected. The estimates suggest
that the number of jobs displaced is higher in the non-traded than in the traded sector.
The strongest employment impact is concentrated on medium and low skill occupations
in the the traded and non-traded sector respectively. Contrary to previous works in trade
and local labor market literature (Autor et al., 2013a; Dauth et al., 2014), wage rates are
found to be negatively affected by Chinese imports competition but there is no increase in
overall wage rate inequality. Notably, in none of the sector is the bottom decile affected,
and the non-traded sector’s lower tail inequality is even reduced. This is true only in areas
where the minimum wage is covering more than 10% workers (implying that the lower
decile is in fact equal to the minimum wage). This result provides a striking example of
how labor market institutions mediate the effect of globalization-driven shocks on wage
dispersion.
The present study highlights the rising impact of low-wage competition on local labor
markets. The presence of large local multiplier effects associated with large trade-induced
displacements combined with evidence that there is little labor mobility in response to
shocks in local demand suggest that trade shocks have locally concentrated effects that
are likely to be long-lasting. These trends contribute to explain the popularity of place-
based policies that generally aim at tempering the local consequences of labor demand
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shocks. The design and implementation of optimal place-based policies in the presence
of strong local labor demand shocks and workers low spatial mobility seem therefore an
important area for further research.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Period 1995-2001 Period 2001-2007
Mean Std dev. Median Mean Std dev. Median
Initial employment in thousands 180.3 220.2 88.2 197.2 241.4 103.3
% employment in mfg (initial) 28.8 9.4 27.6 24.4 8.7 23.5
% chge in manufacturing empl. -1.7 10.1 -1.0 -13.3 9.1 -13.1
% chge in non-tradable sector empl. 25.4 5.5 25.3 8.0 7.0 8.1
% medium skill jobs (in total emp.) 20.1 3.3 20.1 20.1 3.2 20.1
% high skill workers (in total emp.) 10.5 5.0 9.0 9.9 5.5 7.9
Hours worked per job: manufacturing 1609.7 69.6 1614.1 1491.5 65.2 1492.7
Hours worked per job: non-traded sector 1293.8 42.4 1298.7 1153.6 42.3 1153.7
∆IPW in $-thousands (2001) 0.168 0.121 0.134 0.898 0.585 0.718
∆DPW in $-thousands (2001) 0.148 0.131 0.117 0.698 0.621 0.0512
Notes: See Equation 1 for definition of ∆IPW and ∆DPW . Except for the first line, all averages are computed using
1995 total employment are weights.
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Table 2: Direct impact of Chinese imports competition on manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS: Jobs IV IV IV IV IV: Hrs IV: Emp. earnings IV: Hrly wage
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆IPW -6.492*** -10.067***-7.975***-7.121***-6.439***-6.293*** -9.111*** -1.790*
(1.305) (1.914) (2.094) (2.040) (1.855) (1.775) (2.111) (0.914)
% employment in mfg (initial) -0.142** -0.176***-0.100 -0.097 0.039 0.093***
(0.062) (0.068) (0.066) (0.070) (0.074) (0.031)
% college -0.689***-0.344***-0.381*** -0.439*** 0.174***
(0.163) (0.123) (0.125) (0.134) (0.059)
% production workers -0.454***-0.204* -0.221* -0.252** 0.027
(0.101) (0.114) (0.115) (0.127) (0.056)
% women -1.353** -1.746***-1.885*** -2.155*** -0.069
(0.660) (0.485) (0.573) (0.676) (0.322)
% foreigners -0.370* -0.481** -0.469** -0.512** -0.074
(0.206) (0.190) (0.210) (0.230) (0.065)
KP stat 40.52 26.56 26.74 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84
Region fixed-effect
√ √ √ √
Notes: N = 696. Baseline sample is a balanced panel of 348 employment zones. Outcomes variables are expressed in
percentage change over six-year period. All specifications include period fixed effect and log of initial total employment.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the employment zone level. *p<.10 ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table 3: Impact of Chinese imports competition on the nontradable sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS: Jobs IV IV IV IV IV: Hrs IV: Emp. earnings IV: Hrly wage
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆IPW -1.832*** -4.479***-5.328***-5.015***-4.055***-2.210** -2.903*** -0.508
(0.599) (1.160) (1.363) (1.329) (0.991) (0.877) (0.972) (0.348)
% employment in mfg (initial) 0.058 0.037 0.181*** 0.165*** 0.201*** 0.049***
(0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.015)
% college -0.453***-0.171 -0.244** -0.432*** -0.073**
(0.141) (0.108) (0.105) (0.114) (0.035)
% production workers -0.210** 0.122 0.047 0.000 -0.090***
(0.083) (0.096) (0.091) (0.099) (0.027)
% women -0.800* -1.091** -1.232*** -1.192** -0.017
(0.446) (0.452) (0.434) (0.486) (0.127)
% foreigners 0.088 -0.147 -0.196 -0.233 -0.013
(0.151) (0.157) (0.155) (0.173) (0.044)
KP stat 40.52 26.56 26.74 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84
Region fixed-effect
√ √ √ √
Notes: N = 696. Baseline sample is a balanced panel of 348 employment zones. Outcomes variables are expressed in
percentage change over six-year period. All specifications include period fixed effect and log of initial total employment.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the employment zone level. *p<.10 ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity within the non-tradable sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Construction Temp. work Hotels Retail Business Transport Rest
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Specification with controls and no region-fixed effects
∆IPW -5.024*** -7.525* 1.677 0.352 -4.113 1.273 -2.446*
(1.924) (4.049) (1.770) (1.680) (2.693) (1.803) (1.474)
KP stat 26.74 26.74 26.74 26.74 26.74 26.74 26.74
Full set of controls (see notes)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Specification with controls and region-fixed effects
∆IPW -3.150** -6.155 2.526 1.237 -1.912 1.078 -1.690
(1.456) (3.805) (1.771) (1.537) (2.204) (1.703) (1.316)
KP stat 27.71 27.71 27.71 27.71 27.71 27.71 27.71
Full set of controls (see notes)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Region fixed-effect
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Notes: N = 696. Baseline sample is a balanced panel of 348 employment zones. Outcomes variables are expressed in
percentage change over six-year period. All specifications include period fixed effect and log of initial total employment.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the employment zone level. *p<.10 ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table 5: Placebo regression: private employment growth regressed on lead values of
import competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS: Private IV: Private OLS: Lagged IV: Lagged
b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆IPW -2.548*** -4.039*** -0.820 2.320***
(0.421) (0.902) (0.691) (1.042)
KP stat 27.84 27.84
Controls (see notes)
√ √ √ √
Region fixed-effect
√ √ √ √
N 696 696 696 696
Notes: Column 1 and 2 respectively report OLS and IV estimates of specification shown in Equation (2) where the
dependent variable is current employment growth rate (in equivalent of 6 years) in the overall private sector. Column
3 and 4 respectively report OLS and IV estimates of the same specification where employment growth in the private
sector is lagged (1982-1990 for period 1995-2001, 1995-2002 for period 2001-2007). In case, long run unobserved factor
driving down manufacturing employment in local labor markets is correlated with future exposure to Chinese imports
competition, one would expect to find negative coefficients in the Column 3 and 4.
Table 6: Trade deficit per worker: impact on manufacturing employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Jobs IV IV IV IV IV: Hrs IV: Hourly Wage
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆DPW -5.023*** -12.470***-10.344***-9.116***-8.231***-8.044*** -2.287*
(1.237) (2.999) (3.374) (3.144) (2.760) (2.563) (1.228)
% employment in mfg (initial) -0.117 -0.143* -0.072 -0.070 0.101***
(0.072) (0.078) (0.075) (0.078) (0.034)
% college -0.690***-0.312** -0.350*** 0.182***
(0.164) (0.127) (0.128) (0.061)
% production workers -0.500***-0.192 -0.210* 0.030
(0.104) (0.117) (0.119) (0.057)
% women -1.489** -1.866***-2.002*** -0.102
(0.696) (0.505) (0.592) (0.325)
% foreigners -0.354 -0.483** -0.471** -0.074
(0.225) (0.214) (0.231) (0.062)
KP stat 20.42 12.18 12.57 13.61 13.61 13.61
Region fixed-effect
√ √ √
Notes: N = 696. Baseline sample is a balanced panel of 348 employment zones. Outcomes variables are expressed in
percentage change over six-year period. All specifications include period fixed effect and log of initial total employment.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the employment zone level. *p<.10 ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 7: Impact on employment by skill category: manufacturing and non-traded sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low Skill Intermediate Skill High skill Low Skill Intermediate Skill High skill
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Manufacturing
∆IPW -4.066** -15.096*** -1.466 -3.253* -14.561*** -1.544
(1.864) (3.847) (4.154) (1.676) (3.699) (4.072)
Non-traded sector
∆IPW -5.909*** -2.980* 5.686** -4.987*** -1.899 4.950**
(1.420) (1.662) (2.513) (1.099) (1.386) (2.400)
KP stat 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84
Full set of controls (see notes)
√ √ √ √ √ √
Region fixed-effect
√ √ √
Notes: N = 696. Baseline sample is a balanced panel of 348 employment zones. Outcomes variables are expressed in
percentage change over six-year period. All specifications include period fixed effect and log of initial total employment.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the employment zone level. *p<.10 ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Control variables
include: initial share of manufacturing jobs, of female employees, of production employees, of foreign-born employees
and of college educated employees. Skill categories are based on occupation. Clerk and unskilled production workers
are considered low skill occupations. Intermediate professions and low-rank managers are considered medium skill
occupations, while intellectual professions, senior management are considered high-skill occupations.
Table 8: Impact along the wage distribution in manufacturing and the non-traded sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Av. wage 10th pctile 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Manufacturing
∆IPW -1.790* -3.377 -1.635* -1.766* -1.599* -1.295 -1.358 -1.685* -2.562** -2.163**
(0.914) (2.292) (0.891) (0.902) (0.905) (0.906) (0.926) (0.988) (0.995) (1.088)
Non-traded sector
∆IPW -0.508 0.053 -0.811***-1.045***-1.349***-1.250***-1.178***-1.064***-0.509 -0.031
(0.348) (0.313) (0.277) (0.286) (0.313) (0.314) (0.338) (0.375) (0.425) (0.533)
KP stat 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84 27.84
Full set of controls (see notes)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Region fixed-effect
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Notes: N = 696. Baseline sample is a balanced panel of 348 employment zones. Outcomes variables are expressed in
percentage change over six-year period. All specifications include period fixed effect and log of initial total employment.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the employment zone level. *p<.10 ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Control variables
include: initial share of manufacturing jobs, of female employees, of production employees, of foreign-born employees
and of college educated employees. Decile are computed based on jobs reporting positive hours worked and wages,
weighing by hours worked.
Table 9: Effect of Chinese imports competition on different measures of wage inequality
(1) (2) (3)
∆ log q90
q10
∆ log q90
q50
∆ log q50
q10
b/se b/se b/se
Manufacturing
∆IPW 1.214 -0.868 2.082
(2.240) (1.079) (1.783)
(1) (2) (3)
b/se b/se b/se
Non-traded sector
∆IPW -0.085 1.219** -1.304***
(0.593) (0.514) (0.383)
KP stat 27.84 27.84 27.84
Full set of controls (see notes)
√ √ √
Region fixed-effect
√ √ √
Notes: N = 696. Baseline sample is a balanced panel of 348 employment zones. Outcomes variables are expressed in
percentage change over six-year period. All specifications include period fixed effect and log of initial total employment.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the employment zone level. *p<.10 ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Control variables
include: initial share of manufacturing jobs, of female employees, of production employees, of foreign-born employees
and of college educated employees. Decile are computed based on jobs reporting positive hours worked and wages,
weighing by hours worked.
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Table 10: Impact on the first decile depending on the share of workers covered by the
minimum wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manufacturing Non-traded sector
∆IPW -0.801 -0.788 0.096 0.051
(0.832) (0.565) (0.314) (0.311)
∆IPW× Share Min Wage < 10 % -4.409* -4.441 -2.554*** -4.407***
(2.621) (3.684) (0.503) (0.780)
Share Min Wage < 10 % 0.038 1.947***
(1.303) (0.356)
KP stat 18.23 19.47 13.80 13.75
Full set of controls (see notes)
√ √ √ √
Region fixed-effect
√ √ √ √
Notes: N = 696. Baseline sample is a balanced panel of 348 employment zones. Outcomes variables are expressed in
percentage change over six-year period. All specifications include period fixed effect and log of initial total employment.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the employment zone level. *p<.10 ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The share of
minimum wage workers is computed as the share of workers in a given location and sector who hourly wage (salaire
brut horaire) is comprised between 85 and 105 % of the legal minimum wage. Observations whose wage is reported
below 85 % of the minimum wage are dropped.
7 Figures
Figure 1: Imports and trade balance of France with respect to China and other low-wage
countries (list based on Auer et al. (2013))
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Figure 2: The geography of trade exposure and employment growth, 2001-2007
Notes: Black boundaries delimitates employment zones. Each shade corresponds to a quintile of the distribution of the
relevant variables.
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Figure 3: First stage: Stacked periods
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Figure 4: First stage: Long-differences
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Figure 5: Reduced form: Stacked periods
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Figure 6: Reduced form: Long-differences
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A Linking trade and employment data
We use data on trade from the website un.comtrade.org. The trade data follow the
product classification HS 1992 with 6 digit. The data on employment follows the NACE
rev 1.1. classification which is equivalent to the 4-digit CPA 2002 classification. To
convert HS-1992 6-digit codes into NACE 4-digit codes, we do the following:
1. We use a file available on un.comtrade.org to map HS-1992 into HS-2007.
2. We use one file available on http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon to map HS-
2007 into CPA 2002. The latter maps n-to-one to the NACE rev 1.1.
3. We obtain a correspondence mapping from HS-1992 into NACE rev. 1.1 and drop
all HS-1992 6-digit goods that are not uniquely mapped with a NACE 4-digit sector.
Dropped observations account for about 9 %, 8 % and 6% of French imports from
China for years 1995,2001 and 2007 respectively.
Alternatively, trade flows for not-uniquely mapped HS-1992 products could divided
across sectors using weights reflecting each sectors initial “importance” in the economy
(employment for instance). Applying this method using employment in 1995 as weights
do not modify the present results.
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Table 11: Total French Imports: Uniquely and Non-Uniquely Mapped ($ millions)
Total Uniquely Non-uniquely Ratio
1995 5,950 5,385 565 .095
1996 6,833 6,236 597 .0873
1997 7,495 6,874 621 .0828
1998 8,178 7,505 673 .0823
1999 8,943 8,237 706 .079
2000 10,515 9,670 845 .0803
2001 10,450 9,635 815 .078
2002 11,380 10,506 874 .0768
2003 15,850 14,660 1,190 .0751
2004 21,398 19,871 1,527 .0714
2005 26,748 24,737 2,011 .0752
2006 30,968 28,652 2,316 .0748
2007 39,533 37,015 2,518 .0637
Notes: A product code HS-1992 is considered “uniquely mapped” if according it is uniquely mapped according to
our mapping HS-1992→HS-1996 → NACE built using the conversion tables from RAMON (HS 2007 to CPA) and
Comtrade (HS1992 to HS2007). Each observation for product HS1992 that cannot be uniquely mapped to a NACE
sector is dropped (either because there is no mapping or the mapping is not unique). Column (4) displays the the
trade value non-uniquely matched products as the share of overall imports French imports from China. Trade values
are expressed in current dollars.
B Formulating aggregate predictions on the basis “de-
viation from cross-sectional average” estimates
In this section, I analyze a univariate linear data generating process with a fixed-effect
(intercept) common to the entire cross-section that is a function of the realized average
of the regressor. The goal is to illustrate the difference between the set of assumptions
required to obtain consistent estimate of individual effect and that required to make ag-
gregate predictions.
Let us consider the following GDP:
yi = µ+ xiβ + ui (7)
We assume E(xiui) = 0, so that we sidestep issues associated with endogenous re-
gressor. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we also assume that E(xi) = 0.
Realization of xi and ui are assumed to be i.i.d.
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Now, we specify µ as being a function of the (un-weighted) sample mean xN .
30
µ := µ(xN) = δ + xNα (8)
So while δ and α are fixed parameters, µ is itself a random variable. Note also that
xNα introduces a rough notion of spill-overs between units i’s. Hence while xi and ui are
i.i.d, yi are not.
31.
In this context, making an “aggregate prediction” is to analyze of the conditional
expectation of the cross-sectional average of yss conditional on that of xis, i.e. E(yN |xN).
Under the stated assumption, we have:
∂E(yN |xN)
∂xN
= α + β (9)
This expression contrasts with the individual effect of xi on the conditional expected
value of yi.
∂E(yi|xi)
∂xi
= α× ∂E(xN |xi)
∂xi
+ β =
α
N
+ β (10)
Throughout the paper, we include period-fixed effect, which in the context of the DGP
above, is akin to using an OLS estimator in deviation from the cross-sectional average.
βˆOLS =
∑N
i (yi − yN)(xi − xN)∑N
i (xi − xN)2
(11)
Substituting Equations 7 and 8, we obtain:
βˆOLS = β
∑N
i (xi − xN)(xi − xN)∑N
i (xi − xN)2
+
∑N
i (ui − uN)(xi − xN)∑N
i (xi − xN)2
= β+
∑N
i (ui − uN)(xi − xN)∑N
i (xi − xN)2
(12)
Clearly under the assumption E(xiui), we have plim βˆOLS = β.
30The use of a weighted mean does not change the nature of the argument.
31It is a special case of a spatial lagged in x model where the weighing matrix contains only 1/N
as entries. It is straightforward to extend the argument to more general weighing matrix, allowing for
instance xNα to be a weighted rather than a simple average, as long as the weights are not i-specific,
therefore ensuring that aggregate effects can be properly “taken out” by demeaning.
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It suggests that in the case where the common intercept is a function of the mean of
the regressor, using cross-sectional variation in deviation from the aggregate trend only
allows to obtain an approximation of ∂E(yi|xi)
∂xi
.
However, as N grows to infinity,32 we have: ∂E(yi|xi)
∂xi
−→ β = plim βˆOLS. Hence
assuming α = 0 is not required to retrieve consistent estimates of ∂E(yi|xi)
∂xi
.
However, ∂E(yN |xN )
∂xN
does not become arbitrarily close to β as N grows large. Moreover,
α cannot be identified using an estimator based on deviations from the cross-sectional
average. As a result, when making aggregate predictions, it becomes necessary to make
an assumption on the sign and magnitude of α. I assume α = 0 throughout the paper,
which appears to lead to conservative predictions as one would expect negative spill-overs
across local labor markets (in this example
∂E(yi|xi,xj)
∂xj
= α
N
< 0), suggesting that α < 0.
32I focus on asymptotic results because in the paper, estimation is carried out using instrumental
variable estimator which has desirable properties asymptotically but not in finite samples. Moreover,
given the large number of observations (348 by cross-section) it seems reasonable to consider the case
where α/N ≈ 0.
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